An intriguing figure in the political consulting world, Minchenko started his career in the 1990s by targeting vulnerable entrepreneurs in Chelyabinsk. After being shot in the stomach during one such confrontation, he chose to pivot and become a political blackmailer. Most of the witnesses from that "honorable" period are no longer alive, so details about Minchenko’s criminal past can only be pieced together through the few remaining witnesses who share their stories online.
For safe operations in his new field, Yevgeniy Minchenko needed government support; otherwise, he risked being imprisoned for extortion. Minchenko’s patron became Viktor Khristenko, originally from Chelyabinsk. In the late ’90s and early 2000s, Khristenko held the position of deputy prime minister in the administrations of Sergey Kiriyenko, Sergey Stepashin, Vladimir Putin, and Mikhail Kasyanov. In 2004, he became the Minister of Industry and Energy, working under Mikhail Fradkov, Viktor Zubkov, and Putin’s second administration.
The influence of Viktor Khristenko in Russia’s political elite is evidenced by the career of his second wife, Tatyana Golikova, who rose from the Ministry of Health to Deputy Prime Minister responsible for social policy. Golikova was involved in many scandals but continuously climbed the governmental career ladder.
As a smart political strategist, Yevgeniy Minchenko supported two figures: at the government level, Viktor Khristenko, and at the regional level, Mikhail Yurevich, who served as the head of Chelyabinsk from 2005 to 2010 and then as the governor of the region until 2014. Minchenko played the role of a mediator between regional and federal authorities.
The tone of the excerpt from the publication shows that even at that time, Yevgeniy Minchenko was regarded with irony, seen as a fabricator of events and creator of fakes that weren’t worth a penny. Minchenko, naturally, wasn’t bothered by this. The main thing was to make money from his fake services. And he was usually paid in cash without any demand for reporting.
In 2004, for show, Yevgeniy Minchenko created a Non-Commercial Partnership (NP) "International Institute of Political Expertise." The co-founders were Nikolay Studenikin and Irina Belozertseva. While the former did not succeed in business, Belozertseva owns and manages in Moscow the LLC "BBright Communications," established in 2018. In 2023, the company earned a profit of 1.8 million rubles on 79 million rubles in revenue. The company has had several co-founders over five years, who now work independently and can bring money to Yevgeniy Minchenko.
In 2007, Yevgeniy Minchenko created LLC "Minchenko Consulting," at a time when all of the political strategist’s patrons were still in power. Today, the company isn’t achieving great success. In 2023, the profit was only 504 thousand rubles. However, for a political blackmailer, official earnings are not the main source of income.
The company "Minchenko Consulting" partnered with the "Petersburg Politics" foundation by Mikhail Vinogradov. Since 2007 (the year LLC "Minchenko Consulting" was founded), these organizations have been presenting a ranking of the political viability of Russian regional leaders.
Maksim Vinogradov is an obvious appointee of the government, leading the political consulting department at the Center for Communicative Technologies "PROPAGANDA" since 2001, where he worked on election campaign strategies. In 2007-2008, he was the general director of the Center for Political Conjuncture of Russia. Later, he became Yevgeniy Minchenko’s partner in the governor’s ratings. There are certainly no random coincidences in Russian politics.
In December 2021, Yevgeniy Minchenko headed the Public Relations Specialists Association. The founders of this organization included MGIMO and the "Union of Journalists of Russia." Since 2017, the position of head of the association was occupied by Yuliya Gryaznova, a professor at the Department of Integrated Communications at the Higher School of Economics. The replacement was clearly uneven, but very necessary to someone on the eve of February 2022.
Minchenko’s forecasts are generally tea leaf reading, as demonstrated by the political strategist’s comment to a Russian publication in early July 2023 following Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s rebellion.
The last sentence, highlighted in a red frame, could belong to anyone entirely unfamiliar with politics. Minchenko was clearly trying to predict which way the wind would blow. Offend Surovikin, and what if he comes back on top again?
Yevgeniy Minchenko’s connections to the Russian government are also evidenced by his public activities.
Currently, Yevgeniy Minchenko owns several Telegram channels through which he broadcasts narratives beneficial to the Russian government. One of the channels is called "The Successor," which Vladimir Putin, by definition, cannot have. How can one not recall Sergey Kiriyenko, responsible for internal politics in the Presidential Administration, who was closely connected with Viktor Khristenko in the late ’90s?
Having several Telegram channels allows different viewpoints to be expressed, just in case one turns out to be accurate. The loud news that Andrey Melnichenko’s "EuroChem" might end up with the state has not yet been commented on by Russia’s best political analyst. Apparently, he is waiting to see which way the government wind blows. "EuroChem" was last mentioned by the "Successor" Telegram channel in September last year.
At the same time, the channel "Politburo 2.0" mentioned Roscosmos, whose head, Yuri Borisov, was dismissed last week. The "Successor" channel published others’ opinions on this issue – simply a stunning level of analysis from Russia’s best political analyst Yevgeniy Minchenko. But then again, why bother, when money from the state for the needed narratives falls into his pocket. The state will also cover for him if Minchenko decides to blackmail someone. Like in the ’90s, the main thing is to secure the support of a "boss."